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China and the Global Terms
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Raphael Kaplinsky
1 Working with the general and
the particular
The terms of trade have dominated development
thinking since the early 1950s when Singer and
Prebisch produced analyses of price trends, which
suggested that there was a secular trend towards
a fall in the commodities–manufactures terms of
trade (Prebisch 1950; Singer 1950). The
Singer–Prebisch hypothesis was more complex
than is often acknowledged, for it not only took
into account the income and price elasticities of
demand for different products, but also the role
played by labour markets in price determination
(Kaplinsky 2005a).
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It resulted in a widespread
commitment to industrialisation, premised on the
expectation that the relative price of manufactures
would continue to rise, and that of commodities
to fall.
The estimation of the terms of trade is bedevilled
by two major problems. First, it depends on the
degree of aggregation which is involved. At the
highest level of aggregation, “manufactures” and
“commodities” are each categories which hide very
significant variations. Manufactures, for example,
includes purpose-manufactured ‘complex production
systems’ (Acha et al. 2004), such as aerospace
products which are based on cost-plus pricing, and
very simple manufactured products (such as nuts
and bolts) which are sold into very competitive
markets. Similarly, “commodities” includes both
precious materials such as diamonds and
undifferentiated commodities such as robusta coffee.
A second problem with the terms of trade discussion
is that it is often undifferentiated by country. The
terms of trade of a particular economy cannot be
read off from the “average” terms of trade since it
will have an individual pattern of trade, some of
which may be subject to preferential pricing regimes,
and this in turn depends on the direction of trade
(e.g. there are at least three “prices” for sugar in
different global markets).
Great care therefore has to be taken in deriving
specific policy responses from generalised trends
in prices. Nevertheless, generalised trends in prices
do provide pointers to researchers for more detailed
enquiry which might inform effective policy-
making. This article addresses a general issue: what
sorts of impact is the rise of the Asian Driver
economies in general, and China in particular,
having on global prices? The speed and recent
nature of the rise of the Asian Drivers economies
means that this impact is still uncertain; we also do
not know if it will be sustained over time.
Nevertheless, it will be argued below that the nature
of the “price disturbances” which appear to be
arising as a result of the size and rapid growth of
China and India, is such that it is deserving of
considerable further research, and careful attention
by policy-makers. What follows, therefore, is a
discussion which should be seen more as a pointer
to further detailed research enquiry than as an input
into detailed policy prescription.
Although this discussion focuses on the Chinese
economy, by 2030 or sooner, it is likely that India
will have become the world’s third largest economy.
This, too, could have a major impact on relative
prices, particularly if its trade structure is similar
to that of China, thus reinforcing the China-induced
changes in global supply and demand.
2 Why is China important?
As we can see from Table 1, China’s growth rate over
the past two decades has been significantly more
rapid than any of the various groupings of countries
by income (and similarly by region, although we
have chosen to use income-groupings as the
comparator). Using purchasing power parity (PPP)
constant prices, per capita incomes in China grew
IDS Bulletin Vol 37 No 1 January 2006 © Institute of Development Studies
at an average rate of more than 8 per cent during
the 1980s and more than 9 per cent during the
1990s. This far exceeded growth rates in any of the
country income groupings.
This growth was increasingly outward-oriented.
Before China’s outward thrust (beginning around
1979), its trade-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio
was less than 10 per cent, compared with a global
average of almost 30 per cent. By 2002, its trade-
GDP ratio had risen to 55 per cent, exceeding the
global average of 47 per cent (Figure 1).
While the growth rate of China’s exports has been
no greater than that of the previous generation of
Asian outward-oriented economies such as Japan
and Korea from their point of trade expansion (Figure
2), it is the sheer size of China’s economy which
threatens to disequilibrate past patterns of price
formation. This is reflected in China’s growing share
of manufactured imports into the US, the EU and
Japan (Table 2). Between 1980 and 2002, its share
of total manufactured imports (including many
products which China does not produce or export
in significant numbers) rose from virtually nothing
to 14 per cent in the US. In the buyer-driven
consumer products sectors, which have not been
subject to major import quotas, its share of total
imports has grown dramatically, particularly in the
case of Japan and the US. In footwear, and toys and
games where its presence has not been hindered by
import quotas, it now accounts for more than two-
thirds of all imports into both the US and Japan and
for two-thirds of imports of travel goods into the US.
The pace of its growing presence in the clothing and
textile sectors has hitherto been constrained by import
quotas, but these quotas were removed in January
2005, with a consequent increase in market share
IDS Bulletin 37.1 Asian Drivers: Opportunities and Threats
44
Table 1: Relative growth rates, GDP per capita, 1985 PPP $
1980s 1990s 1997–2002
Low income 2.4 2.3 2.7
Lower–middle-income 2.5 2.3 4.3
Middle income 1.8 2.2 3.5
Upper–middle-income ?0.8 1.7 0.1
High income 2.4 1.8 1.7
World 1.6 1.5 2.0
China 8.3 9.3 6.7
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2004).
Figure 1: Trade as a proportion of GDP (%), 1970–2002
Source: Calculated from World Bank, World Development Indicators (2004).
(see Morris and McCormick et al. in this IDS Bulletin).
For example, following quota removal, China’s share
of EU clothing imports rose between the first quarters
of 2004 and 2005 from 7 to 17 per cent for T-shirts,
from 6 to 38 per cent for pullovers, from 6 to 35 per
cent for men’s trousers and from 10 to 45 per cent
for linen fabrics (data supplied by Nathan Associates).
Another indication of the impact of China on
global markets can be seen in the evolution of
shipping freight rates (Figure 3). China’s demand
for imports and growth in exports has been so great
as to lead to a shortage of global shipping capacity,
manifesting itself in 2001. For both iron ore and
grain, freight rates reached levels which were more
than double the previous highs in 1973 and 1995,
respectively (although these rates are not price-
deflated). The cause? … As a major ship-chandler
observed: ‘Chinese iron ore, steel and soybean
demand was unquestionably the main reason ocean
freight rates for dry bulk commodities hit all time
highs earlier this year’.
2
3 China’s trade and global prices
At the same time that China’s rapid growth and
trade expansion have been proceeding, there have
been signs of changing trends in global prices. In
some cases, we can observe a trend of falling prices,
in other cases of rising prices.
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Figure 2: Growth path of exports from point of export-surge: Japan (1960–2003), 
Korea (1963–2003) and China (1979–2003)
Calculated from World Bank, World Development Indicators (2004).
Table 2: Share of imports from China – EU, Japan and the US, 1995 and 2002
EU Japan US
1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002
All manufactures 2.2 4.0 5.3 6.8 7.6 13.8
Textiles 2.5 4.6 31.3 47.5 11.6 15.8
Clothing 7.9 11.5 56.6 78.1 14.9 15.1
Other consumer products 6.4 9.5 19.7 31.6 25.5 36.5
Footwear 6.7 9.7 47.3 67.4 52.3 68.2
Travel goods 40.4 45.1 32.9 45.2 47.4 64.2
Toys and games 26.0 35.8 26.4 63.5 48.4 66.6
Furniture 7.0 6.2 11.2 34
Source: Kaplinsky (2005b).
3.1 Declining prices of manufactures
Much of the second half of the twentieth century
was a period of inflation in the global economy.
Prices of most commodities rose, although the price
rise was faster for manufactures than for primary
products. By the 1990s, most economies had begun
to get on top of high rates of inflation and for the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) economies as a whole, the
rate of inflation at the turn of the millennium was
less than 3 per cent. What followed was a period
of price deflation in manufactures, beginning with
a slowdown in the rate of inflation in the late 1980s,
and then after 1998, in absolute nominal prices
(Figure 4).
How does China’s trade expansion relate to these
falling prices? The terms of trade literature is almost
entirely based on the use of aggregated data, mostly
using Standard International Trade Classification
(SITC) three- and very occasionally SITC four-digit
classifications. As we observed above, this is not
adequate for a detailed examination of prices. The
HS trade classification system introduced in the
late 1980s has a much finer degree of disaggregation
and provides greater scope for the detailed tracking
of product prices. At the eight-digit level there are
10,000 different HS product categories. The EU
provides a unique data-set on international trade
and is large enough to use as a surrogate for the
behaviour of global product prices. (However, as
with all HS trade data, this data-set only stretches
back to 1988.)
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Figure 3: Shipping freight rates, 1973–2003
Source: Kaplinsky (2005b).
Figure 4: World manufacturing export price, 1986–2000
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September (2003).
Figure 5 analyses changes in the global prices
of manufactures which are of major concern to
developing country exporters. It focuses on the
major product-groupings (classified at the eight-
digit level) imported into the EU where developing
country exporters were prominent. It reports the
proportion of the sectors for which the unit price
of imports from different income groups (and
China) fell between 1988 and 2001. It can be seen
from this that in almost one-third of these sectors,
the price of Chinese-origin products fell. In the case
of products emanating from low-income economies,
the proportion of product group in which unit
prices fell was around one-quarter. As a general
rule, the higher the per capita income group of the
exporter, the less likely unit prices fall. Thus, within
a significant number of product groups, the prices
of products exported into the EU by China and
low-income economies was more likely to decline
than the prices of the same products-groupings
sourced from other high-income economies.
We draw two conclusions from this price analysis.
First, the greater China’s participation in global
product markets, the more likely prices will fall.
And, second, this seems to have a disproportionate
impact on the low-income country group who faces
intense competition from Chinese producers.
3.2 Rising prices of hard commodities’
By definition, manufactures involve the transformation
of inputs into outputs. In the case of automobiles, for
example, more than 5,000 components are involved,
and each of these in turn requires the input of a variety
of raw- and semi-processed materials. The advance
of global value chains over the last two decades of the
twentieth century resulted in a significant increase in
global trade in components and hence in a growth
of import intensity in export production in almost
every country. For example, in the case of China, the
proportion of export revenue which reflected direct
imports into production processes rose from 8 to 12
per cent between 1980 and 1998, and in the case of
direct and indirect imports (that is, taking account
of the imports going into the production of
domestically sourced inputs), it rose from 15 to 23
per cent in the same period (Martin and Manole 2003).
Consequently, with rapidly growing production
destined for both the domestic and export market,
it is not surprising that China has become a very
large market for the exports of other countries. In
many cases, it has imported manufactured products,
particularly capital goods from Japan. In addition,
Chinese exports of products such as consumer
electronics, have involved the assembly of
components sourced from the East Asian region.
3
However, from the perspective of developing
economies, particularly those outside of the East
Asia region (see Evans et al. in this IDS Bulletin), it
is China’s sourcing of “hard” and semi-processed
commodities which represent a particularly
significant impact on prices in the global economy.
Focusing on basic metals as an example, China’s
demand for imports has been fuelled by three
factors. The first has been the rapid growth of
China and the Global Terms of Trade
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Figure 5: Percentage of sectors with negative price trends, 1988/9–2000/01 by country
groupings
Source: Kaplinsky (2005b).
domestic demand for household consumer goods
and autos (where production has grown at a
dramatic pace). Second, there has been very
substantial investment in infrastructure, both in
the public and private sector, and this has been
particularly metals-intensive. And, third, many of
China’s exports have been of metal-based products.
Consequently, China’s share of global demand for
the main base metals (aluminium, copper, iron ore,
nickel, steel and zinc) grew from 17 per cent of
global demand in 1993 to 20–25 per cent in 2003.
In the case of steel, its share has grown from less
than 10 per cent in 1990 to more than 25 per cent
in 2003, equivalent to three times that of Japan,
and more than either the EU or the US (around 20
per cent each). Between 2000 and 2003, China’s
share of the increase in global demand for
aluminium, steel, nickel and copper was 76 per
cent, 95 per cent, 99 per cent and 100 per cent,
respectively. As Figure 6 shows, its projected
utilisation of these basic metals is likely to grow
even further in the future, in part because of its
relatively low per capita consumption of these
materials (Table 3) – bear in mind that China
accounts for more than 20 per cent of global
population and it is inevitable that as incomes grow
and the minerals-intensity of consumption grows
as it has in other countries, this will continue to
lead to rising demand for imported materials.
This thirst for mineral imports is also reflected
in the food sector, where falling land availability (a
consequence of rising industrialisation) and stagnant
agricultural productivity have led to rising food
imports. In the first half of 2004, China had a trade
deficit on foodstuffs of US$3.7bn, including imports
of 4.1m tonnes of foodgrains. It is predicted that
this deficit will soar in the future; in the case of
foodgrains, to around 40m tonnes by 2007
(Financial Times, 23 August 2004).
This expansion in Chinese commodity imports
has been closely reflected in the global prices of
many hard commodities. For example:
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●
Between 2002 and 2004, the price of hot-rolled
coil steel rose from around US$140/tonne to
more than US$500/tonne, significantly higher
than the previous postwar peak of US$400/tonne
in 1994.
●
Prices of spot steam coal (cif Rotterdam) leapt
from US$27/tonne to US$82/tonne between 2002
and 2004, higher than the previous postwar peak
of 1981. Hard-coking coal prices jumped from
US$50/tonne to more than US$100/tonne in the
same period, a postwar high.
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Figure 6: Actual and projected global share of China’s consumption of base metals,
1950–2010
Source: Macquarie Research Metals and Mining, personal communication (2004).
●Between 2001 and 2004, copper prices more than
doubled from around 63cts/lb to US$1.40/lb,
although in this case they were still lower than the
previous postwar peak of US$1.55/lb in 1989.
These are undeflated prices and represent a price
spur which has been very recent (that is, since
2000). However, they reflect the data presented in
Figure 6 above on China’s augmentation of global
demand in hard commodities. Will they endure?
The data in Table 3, allied to China’s continued
rapid growth, suggests that this is not a short-term
blip in commodity prices.
4 Implications for the terms of
trade
How might the data presented in Section 3 above
be reflected in the terms of trade, that is the prices
of manufactures relative to the prices of
commodities? First, the data challenges the view
that commodity prices are on a downward trend.
As we have seen, the price of many of the “hard
commodities”, which have previously been in long-
term decline, appear to have risen in the early 2000s.
In many sectors, there are supply constraints, and
the gestation period for new investments to come
on stream often exceeds five years. Moreover, it is
not inevitable that the prices of all primary “soft
commodities” will fall. There are opportunities for
value accretion in these commodities which reflect
the same processes of Schumpeterian rents, which
Singer and Prebisch argued were unique to
manufactures in the 1950s. There is an increasing
number of niche-market speciality commodities:
organic and fair-traded products, shade-grown
coffee, exotic fruits and vegetables, and so on, each
of which earns a rent in increasingly differentiated
product markets. It is significant here that the most
accurate indicator of per capita incomes of shoppers
in the UK is the share of (predominantly imported)
fresh fruit and vegetables in their shopping trolleys.
At the same time, the data in Section 3 above
challenges the assertion in the early Prebisch–Singer
thesis, questioned in Singer’s revisiting of the terms
of trade debate in the early 1970s and early 1990s
(Singer 1971; Sarkar and Singer 1991), that
manufactured prices would continue to rise. There
is a significant category of manufactures, particularly
those in which China participates, in which prices
appear to be falling. Figure 5 above shows the results
of a detailed inquiry at the eight-digit level, but
there is anecdotal evidence available to virtually
every reader of the sometimes astonishing fall in
product prices. This author recently purchased an
electronic watch (having the identical electronic
movements as a US$100 watch) plus ten videotapes
(all made in China) for a retail price of around £6.99.
Referring back to China’s growing share of T-shirts,
pullovers and men’s trousers noted earlier, in the
same time period (first quarter of 2004 to first
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Table 3: The scope for China’s increased consumption of basic metals, 1955–2003
kg per capita GDP per capita (US$ 1995)
Aluminium Copper Steel
Japan
1955 0.6 1.2 80 5559
1975 10.5 7.4 599 21,869
Korea
1975 1.0 1.3 84 2891
1995 15.0 8.1 827 10,841
China
1990 0.7 0.6 59 342
1999 2.3 1.2 108 756
2002 3.3 2.0 160 933
2003 4.0 2.4 200 1103
Source: Macquarie Metals and Mining, personal communication, 2004.
quarter of 2005), the respective average prices of
these commodities fell by 26, 47 and 16 per cent.
How might global prices evolve in the short- to
medium-term future? Here we can distinguish
between the demand and the supply sides of these
changing conditions affecting global prices. On the
demand side, there is no reason to doubt that the
scope for consumption in general, and niche-based
consumption in particular, will continue to grow.
Indeed, as global incomes rise, including in
consumption-conscious China, the search for
positional goods is likely to strengthen the demand
for differentiated products, including differentiated
“soft commodities”. Similarly, although there are
many who doubt whether China can sustain an
annual growth rate of more than 9 per cent for many
decades into the future, there is widespread
agreement that it will continue to grow rapidly, and
at a faster rate than the global economy as a whole.
Given that China accounts for almost one-fifth of
the global population, this suggests a world of robust
demand. Moreover, lurking around the corner is
the spectre of India, likely to have a population
larger than China by 2030, and currently also
growing at more than 6 per cent a year since the
late 1990s.
If demand is likely to be robust, what of supply?
Will China begin to experience capacity constraints
which will diminish its potential for forcing global
product prices in manufactures down? One sign
that this might be the case is the shortage of labour
in the coastal region and in Beijing in the summer
of 2004. However, this labour shortage was an
aberration, associated with the concentration of
manufacturing production in the eastern coastal
regions and the high cost of living encountered by
migrant labour. China has, and continues to have
a very large reserve army of labour in the interior,
and firms locating away from the coast pay much
lower wages. The Japanese managing director of a
Chinese subsidiary observed – ‘If we run out of
people we just go deeper into China’ (Roberts and
Kynge 2003).
Table 4 shows that in the largest 14 OECD
economies – the economies with high wages
threatened by imports from low-wage economies
– employment in formal-sector manufacturing fell
by 8 per cent between 1995 and 2002. But what is
perhaps even more surprising is that contrary to
expectations, there was an even more significant
fall in employment in China (by 15 per cent), and
by 20 per cent in the third largest developing
country manufacturing sector (Brazil). The overall
picture for these 17 largest manufacturing
economies was a decline in total employment in
formal sector manufacturing from 200m to 176m,
a fall of 12 per cent in seven years.
The experience of China is particularly surprising
since, as we saw in Table 1, it has been such a
successfully growing economy. It is also a
particularly important economy due to its size, with
a formal sector employed labour force larger than
that in the combined 14 largest OECD economies.
However, the rapid growth in employment during
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Table 4: Employment in formal sector manufacturing, 1995–2002
Employment (’000) Index of employment (1995=100)
OECD 14
*
China India Brazil OECD 14
*
China India Brazil
1995 85,623 98,030 6,500 9,438 100 100 100 100
1996 84,508 97,360 6,800 8,739 99 99 105 93
1997 83,003 96,120 6,900 8,381 97 98 106 89
1998 81,728 83,190 6,800 7,882 95 85 105 84
1999 81,266 81,090 6,700 7,420 95 83 103 79
2000 81,486 80,430 6,600 7,478 95 82 102 79
2001 80,535 80,830 6,400 7,565 94 82 98 80
2002 78,761 83,080 6,500 7,556 92 85 100 80
*
US, Canada, Germany, UK, Japan, Russia, Italy, France, Taiwan, Korea, Spain, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden.
Source: Calculated from Carson (2003).
the first half of the 1970s gave way to a process of
employment displacement during the 1990s,
particularly in state-owned enterprises and township
and village enterprises (TVEs). As China entered
the global economy after the early 1980s, this labour
displacement was particularly acute in
manufacturing. But it is also evident in mining
(Rawski 2003). Even these numbers underestimate
the extent of real labour displacement in China,
since many people in the state-owned and township
and village enterprises remain on the books but are
effectively unemployed. This is because there
remains a residue of enterprises which continue to
keep workers on their payroll (so that they can get
access to social security services), even though there
is no sense in which they are actually working
productively (Gu 2003). A variety of observers
concur that there are something like 100–150
million people in China currently working at very
low levels of productivity and who are waiting to
be absorbed into the global economy. This surplus
labour force is equivalent to more than one-quarter
of the total labour force in all high-income
economies. Yet, this labour surplus does not show
up in Chinese labour statistics: ‘The officially
released low (formal) unemployment figures,
however, do not reflect the severity of the actual
high unemployment … [which] ... takes place in
urban China, not in the form of open
unemployment, but rather in the form of lay-offs.
Laid-off workers, according to an official definition,
are those who loose [sic] their jobs as their
employing units encounter economic difficulties,
while still maintaining their nominal employment
relationship with their employees’ (Gu 2003: 2).
Rawski concludes that ‘[e]xpansion of formal
employment during the 1990s is entirely
attributable to increases in rural jobs … [and]
employment prospects deteriorated dramatically
after 1995, with large numbers pushed out of the
formal sector’ (Rawski, 2003: 4–5). One of the
consequences of this opening-up to the global
economy, argues Rawski, is that the barriers to
domestic migration have dropped sharply, so that
up to 100m people moved their place of residence
during the 1990s.
This indicates that wages are unlikely to grow
in China in the medium term, at least in the export-
oriented manufacturing industries which have the
capacity to move into the interior and be serviced
by the mass of rural unemployed and
underemployed.
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And, if and when they do, India
sits on a labour force of 470m (compared with the
770m in China), and there is a plentiful supply of
labour in Indonesia and other populated Asian
economies (Figure 7). The medium-term prognosis
for manufacturing prices, or at least for those
manufactures which can be produced by low-
income economies such as China and India (and
this includes a growing number of higher-
technology sectors), is of continuing price pressures.
5 The wider implications
There are a number of wider implications which
follow on from this preliminary analysis, affecting
the research agenda, theory and policy.
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Figure 7: The global labour force (2002)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2004).
Notes
1. One little-noted explanation for changing terms of trade
in the Prebisch–Singer analysis was that prices were in
large part determined by labour markets. In the
industrialised countries, tight labour markets and
powerful trades unions led to cost-plus pricing; in less
developed economies, labour-surpluses led to labour-
pool determined wages and low prices. In those days,
less developed countries exported commodities and
industrialised economies exported manufactures, and in
the absence of suitable databases for the price of different
types of products, Prebisch–Singer used the
commodities–manufactures terms of trade as a surrogate
for country- and product-specific prices.
2. Tom Cutler, Clarksons, personal communication.
3. China’s trade deficit with East Asia grew from US$4bn
in 1990 to US$40bn in 2002, and the region’s share of
China’s merchandise imports grew from 55 to 62 per cent
in the same period (Lall and Albaladejo 2004).
4. All data from Macquarie Research.
5. This is not inconsistent with rising wages in the coastal
regions associated with the production of higher
technology products. China possesses such a large expanse
and working-age population that it is able to work with
a segmented labour market. High-tech industries with
high wages, competing with products from high-income
economies will be located on the coastal region; low-tech
industries competing with low-wage economies will be
located in the interior.
First, the data presented in the earlier sections of
this article are essentially speculative. Although the
analysis of manufacturing prices was undertaken at
an unusually high level of disaggregation, there is
further scope for the careful tracking of price trends
of both manufactures and commodities (and indeed
also of services) over time and at a level which allows
for the capturing of the increasing differentiation of
product markets. This then needs to feed into the
relativity of prices between different types of products
and, to be useful as a policy tool, to the trade-weighted
terms of trade of individual economies. But detail is
important in this analysis, particularly in the context
of the growing differentiation of product markets.
Second, an association between the rising global
presence of the Asian Driver economies in general,
and China in particular, and trends in global prices
has been noted. While this article has argued that
this is a causal link, this may be only a weak causal
link. Other factors, including the feeding through
of higher energy prices, changing exchange rates
and the determination of global demand and supply
may be playing an equally important, if not more
important role in determining price trends.
Unravelling the contribution of these differing
contributors to price formation is an important
challenge for further research.
Third, assuming that these price changes are
more than a temporary blip, they pose major
challenges for development policy. To what extent
should industry be given primacy over agriculture,
or indeed services? Or is it rather a matter of different
types of industry (briefly, activities incorporating
innovation rents) and different types of commodities
and services? In this case, the policy challenge is
one designed to encourage innovation generically,
rather than a particular economic sector. If, so how
can these “dynamic capabilities” (Teece et al. 1992)
be endogenised and, as a particular development
challenge, made accessible to poor producers?
Finally, to the geopolitics of the rise of the Asian
Drivers. In previous eras of rapid growth, there has
been close correspondence between price trends and
geopolitical positioning. In the nineteenth century,
the commodity hunger of industrialising Europe led
not just to rising demand for commodities, but also
to colonialism and imperialism. In the post-World
War II era, some argued that the requirements of the
US for industrial materials led to its growing
imperialistic footprint during the 1960s (Magdoff
1969) and to its involvement in the Gulf Wars in the
early 1990s and in 2003 (Rutledge 2005). If true,
what lessons can be learned with regard to the
growing resource hunger of the Asian Drivers? What
will be the implications of China’s growing trade and
commercial links with African economies in the
midst of civil war and/or with very poor human rights
records? To what extent does this resource hunger
explain the establishment of overseas aid programmes
by both China and India? And how close is the
connection between these changing price trends and
the associated geopolitical repositioning of the Asian
Drivers and other global and regional power?
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